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1 Introduction
This paper studies the nature and the evolution of a system of inter…rm R&D
contractual relationships in the pharmaceutical industry, a domain that has
been characterized by structural breakthroughs in underlying knowledge bases.
The goal of this essay is twofold.
First, the case of the pharmaceutical industry after the revolution in molec-
ular biology is used here as a natural experiment to analyze how patterns of
technological change shape the structure of local market interactions (see Kir-
man, 1998). In contrast with the old-line pharmaceutical industry, in which
R&D was dominated by a ‘routinezed mode of development’ (Nelson, Winter,
1982) and, correspondingly, by a small number of large …rms that were rela-
tively self-su¢cient, the new paradigm (Dosi, 1982) of molecular biology and
biotechnology has fostered the emergence of an entrepreneurial regime (Winter,
1984), since research breakthroughs have been so widely distributed that no
single …rm has all the internal capabilities necessary for success (see Powell et
al., 1996). Starting from the beginning of the Eighties, hundreds of new science-
based entrepreneurial companies, located mostly in the U.S., have entered the
industry acting as specialized suppliers whithin speci…c R&D trajectories, and
giving origin to a market for the exchange of intermediate technological inputs
(market for technologies: see Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 1999). In this pa-
per, we do represent the market for technologies as a graph, and we show that
such a representation can reveal how relevant technological conditions induce
distinguishable patterns of structural change in a complex set of contractual
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relationships. Our graph theoretical tools and measures enable us to illustrate,
whitout any reference to standard classi…cations of industrial …gures, how pat-
terns of technological change act splitting the overall market in a number of
more or less distinct submarkets (technological tra jectories), characterized by
various degrees of interdependence (Sutton, 1998). It is our claim that such
an analytical apparatus can be used in any R&D intensive industry to assess
the implications of entrepreneurship and markets for technologies for patterns
of specialization and division of labor, industry structure and, ultimately, eco-
nomic growth.
Second, while the economic and managerial literature have touched upon
some aspects of markets for technology, a sytematic understanding of how they
work and what are their economic implications is still in its infancy. Against
this background, this essay reveals, even if in an indirect way, that markets
for technology can realize a synthesis of market-based, technology-based, and
…rm-based coordination mechanisms, succeeding in the integration of a variety
of learning processes by legally distinct entities that are heterogeneous in skills,
competencies, access to information, and assets (see Powell et al., 1996).
The paper is organized in three Sections. Section 2 highlights the nature
of the most relevant research heuristics and techniques developed by …rms and
institutions in the last twenty years in their e¤orts to discover and develop new
e¤ective drugs. In Section 3 the evolution of the overall system of R&D con-
tractual relationships is analyzed. We investigate an extensive data set that
covers around 3,000 research licensing agreements of known technological con-
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tent between around 1,500 …rms for 1978-1997. First, we do analyze some of the
most relevant properties of the relationships of local interdependence, within the
market, building a non-parametric statistical test that use information on …rms
and their neighborhood in order to assess the nature of the connection between
technological bases and relational behaviors within the market. Then, we refer
to the notion of Canonical Decomposition of a Graph in order to use an infor-
mation on structural interdependencies wich is global in nature, to disentangle
two major drivers/components of the structural evolution of the market over
time. That is, co-specialized and transversal actors that rely on co-specialized
and transversal research technologies. In Section 4 we sum up the main …ndings
and implications of our analysis
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2 Pharmaceutical innovation after the revolu-
tion in molecular biology
The last twenty-…ve years have witnessed a revolution in biological sciences,
with signi…cant basic advances in molecular biology, cell biology, biochemistry,
protein and peptide chemistry, physiology, pharmacology and other relevant sci-
enti…c disciplines. The application of these new bodies of knowledge to pharma-
ceutical industry has had an enormous impact on the nature of R&D activities,
on the organizational capabilities required to introduce new drugs, and on pat-
terns of industry evolution (see Galambos, Sturchio, 1996; Henerson, Orsenigo,
Pisano, 1999).
In particular, it has been emphasized that the emergence of a dense set of
collaborative relationships among …rms of di¤erent types and other research in-
stitutions has been a major feature of the recent evolution of the pharmaceutical
industry.
Let us brie‡y summarize the basic properties of the dynamics of knowledge
within the industry during the last twenty years (a far more detailed account
can be found in Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000).
First, a process of fast expansion of biological knowledge in the …elds of
biochemistry, physiology and pathology has been upsurging within the industry.
Secondly, the growth of biological knowledge has been taking the form of
a speci…cation process with novelty, in which general hypotheses give origin to
a variety of new sub-hypotheses, that in turn develop other sub-hypotheses at
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lower levels of generality, and so on.
Third, as a consequence, the structure of knowledge comes to have a distinct
hierarchica l nature.
Fourth, the overall process of growth of biological knowledge is highly cumu-
lative, since it is based on a dynamics which introduces progressive speci…cations
of biological hypotheses at each level of the hierarchy.
Fifth, the very nature of the dynamics of knowledge imposes a speci…c struc-
ture on the degree of stability of the hypotheses: at higher levels of the hierarchy,
hypotheses tend to stay relatively stable, since their falsi…cation occurs over a
relatively long time scale, being based on the falsi…cation/selection of hypotheses
at lower levels of generality.
Sixth, during the Nineties, in response to the dramatic increase of the num-
ber of novel biological targets for therapeutic intervention, new research tech-
nologies, which achieve a higher breadth of applications in terms of both disease
areas and biological targets, have been developed (see Harvey, 1998): from Poly-
merase Chain Reaction to protein structure modelling, to rapid computer based
drug assay and testing, to recombinant chemistry techniques, to chemical sepa-
ration and puri…cation techniques that allow researchers to screen thousands of
potentially promising compounds.
All in all, the role of individual entrepreneurs notwithstanding, the recent
evolution of research strategies and heuristics in pharmaceutical R&D can be
characterized by distinguishing, two main search regimes, that coexist and com-
plement each other within the industry.
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A …rst regime is based on …rms that are endowed with research techniques
that stay coupled with speci…c biological hypotheses and are speci…c to given
…elds of application (co-specialized technologies), while a second regime is char-
acterized by the entry of …rms that control new generic research tools and tech-
niques (transversal technologies). In the case of co-specialized research tech-
nologies, the design and experimentation of each new drug requires individual
analysis, and lessons learned from the design and experimentation of one ther-
apeutic cannot be immediately transferred to the development of other classes
of drugs. Conversely, the appearance of transversal technologies for the produc-
tion and screening of new molecular structures has introduced a new dimension
in the organization of the relevant knowledge bases, since the new technologies
tend to be applicable to (couple with) multiple biological targets and diseases.
Finally, and most important, given that pharmaceutical R&D is particu-
larly costly, uncertain, and lengthy, since it deals with a system — the human
body — far more complex than any mechanical or electronic system (see Gam-
bardella, 1995), economic actors tend to integrate co-specialized and transversal
techniques in their exploration and problem solving activities, originating new
interdependencies among submarkets and technological tra jectories, with the
emergence of new interconnections within the system.
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3 Markets for technology in pharmaceuticals
In this section we analyze the structure and evolution of what we call “Market
for Technologies” in the pharmaceutical industry, worldwide, for 1978-1997.
First, we do highlight some qualitative, global, properties of the structure
of the market. Second, we analyze its most relevant local properties.Third, we
show that the recent evolution of technological knowledge within the industry
has been inducing an upsurge in the degree of interdependency among R&D tra-
jectories and submarkets, with important consequencies on patterns of industry
evolution .
3.1 Data and notation
Data used for this study are drawn form the Pharmaceutical Industry Database
(PHID) developed at the University of Siena. It integrates information from sev-
eral sector-speci…c fonts including a proprietary database on more than 14,000
R&D projects and — as for collaborative agreements — Bioscan, Recombinant
Capital, IBI and Pharmaventures Databases, annual reports (SEC …les ) and
specialized press news (Scrip, Spectrum). PHID provides information on the
typology, technological content and date of signing for 2,785 R&D licensing
agreements signed by 1,709 Firms and Institutions1 during the pre-clinical de-
1 Every agreement may include di¤erent contract typologies. Information on the technolog-
ical content is available for every agreement, as it refers to the underlying discovery technology.
Merger and Acquisitions have been taken into account by collapsing the information relative
to the …rms engaged in consolidation deals starting from the date of subscription.
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velopment phase. Speci…cally, our sample includes 349 leading pharmaceutical
…rms, 1,112 new biotechnology …rms and 248 among universities, hospitals and
other public and private institutions.
Throughout this work, the market is de…ned as it follows:
1 - V : Firms & Institutions with at least one R&D project in
their pipelines;
2 - E : Pharmaceutical R&D projects included in the data set;
3 - o = f(e) : A function f , whose domain is E , and whose range
is contained in V , which single out the Originatotor of each project,
i.e. the company or institution that started the R&D project e;
4- d = s(e) : A function s, whose domain is E, and whose range
is contained in V , where d is identi…ed as the Developer of the R&D
project e;
As we are dealing with the structural evolution of the market, we only focus
on projects for which o 6= d. That is, projects in which an Originator can been
identi…ed and distinguished from a Developer.
According to the above de…nitions, market structure can be represented at
any given time ¿ between 1978 and 1997 by means of a directed graph M¿ (E; V ),
where V is the set of vertices and every edge e within the graph is an oriented
link de…ned by a couple (o; d)2 . Alternatively, the directed graph M¿ can be
represented by an adjacency matrix M¿ () A(M¿ ) = [ado]. Matrix entry ado
equals 1 if an edge e(d; o) does exist and 0 otherwise. In fact, matrix rows report
2 see Harary et al., 1975; Slepian, 1968; Diersel, 1997.
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all the vertices D (Developers), while matrix columns consist of all the vertices
O (Originators):
In order to enable an analysis of the evolution of the structure of the market,
a time ordering has been associated to the directed graph. In particular:
5 - t(d) = time in which …rms/institutions o and d started their
R&D cooperation on project e;
6 - t(o) = time in which …rm/institution o started the R&D
project e;
7 - t(v) = date of v 2 V entry:
It follows that t(d) is always greater than t(o). Hence, every edge in the graph
is time-oriented. That is to say, we are able to distinguish the Firm/Institution
that originated every R&D project from the one that took the lead for its
development.
On the other hand — with reference to the structural evolution of the mar-
ket — a time ordering has been established according to both year of foun-
dation and year of entry of any given …rm/institution3 . Back to the matrix
notation, we can permute the adjacency matrix in order to obtain the or-
dered matrix: A(M ¿) = [ado]¿ ; where ft (1)  :::  t (d)  :::  t (n)  ¿g ;
and ft (1)  :::  t (o)  :::  t (m)  ¿g ; with m and n representing the total
3 IThe time ordering induced by t(v) is complete, while the time-oriented graph generated
by the distinction between Originators and Developers corresponds to a partial order set.
On the relationships between order set theory and graph theory see Asratian et al., 1998,
Ch. 10.
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number of Originators and Developers active within the market at time ¿: Some-
times — for the sake of synthesis — we shall refer to the block matrix B (G)¿ (µ)
obtained after collapsing rows and columns of matrix A(M¿ ) that correspond
to …rms/institutions belonging to a common cohort of entrants µ = [¿; ¿ + µ)
(Generation): In that case, entries bdo of B (G)¿ (µ) indicate the total number
of contractual relationships between Generations d and o.
In sum, the overall market for technology in pharmaceuticals is referred to as
a directed graph (digraph). The digraph is then identi…ed according to a time
orientation, as for every R&D project it is possible to distinguish the Originator
from the Developer. In addition, the digraph has been ordered according to
dates of foundation and dates of entry within the market. As a result, two dis-
tinct time dimensions have been identi…ed: the …rst one is de…ned at the project
level (the distinction project Originator/Developer ); the second is singled out
at the macro level (the emergence of the overall market as a result of …rms entry
and new contractual relationships).
3.2 Entry, complementarities and centralization
The in‡uence of di¤erent technological waves on the structural evolution of the
market can be appreciated, at a …rst glance, by looking at Figure 1. Figure 1 is
based on a 3D graphical representation of the graph by means of level curves.
Columns correspond to the x axis (Originators), while rows correspond to the
y axis (Developers). Levels z(x; y) = bdo indicate the cumulated number of
agreements between Developers d and Originators o; classi…ed according to the
10
year of entry into the network, with darker regions representing areas of higher
relational intensity.
Figure 1 shows that Originators have entered the market by introducing suc-
cessive waves of new research technologies, reshaping the overall market struc-
ture. Firms already active within the market have not played a major role as
Originators in new technological trajectories emerged after their entry. Rather,
earlier entrants have gained access to the new technological trajectories mainly
as Developers. As times goes by, the rate of entry in any given technological
trajectory tends to slow down. That is to say, entrants are closely related to
the emergence of new technological trajectories.
All in all, the evidence on patterns of entry, on relational roles of earlier
and later entrants (Originators/Developers) and, …nally, on new technological
waves, suggests the existence of a dynamic process in which new technological
breakthroughs initially induce the entry of new …rms/institutions as specialized
technology Originators. As times goes by, Developers succeed in developing
internal capabilities in the new …elds. Correspondingly, relational intensity, as
well as ‡ows of entry, shift forward to new technologies and …rms. In addition,
especially after 1992, the emergence of transversal technologies like combinato-
rial chemistry has been perturbating the structure of the market. In particu-
lar, while during the Eighties the extent of inter-generational collaboration was
much more signi…cant than intra-generational collaboration, new entrants based
on transversal technologies have been establishing contractual relations with a
large variety of Developers, irrespective of their age.
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Figure 1: Technological waves within the market
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In order to move a step forward in the analysis of the most important drivers
of the structural evolution of the market, let’s suppose that the total number of
R&D collaborations of a …rm/institution i at time ¿ as Developer D(i; ¿) and as
an Originator O(i; ¿) depends only upon the overall pattern of entry (") — that
is the total number of potential partners within the market — and on the length
of presence within the market (ai). In particular, since we noticed that new
entrants tend to act as Originators of new search hypothesis while incumbents
consolidate their presence within the market as Developers, we suppose that
the potential Originators are younger than potential Developers. So, for each
…rm/institution that entered the market at time "; we weight the actual number
of collaborations for the potential number of agreements they could subscribe as
Developer D(i; ¿) and as Originator O(i; ¿) until time ¿ calculated as follows:
D(i; ¿ ) = m("; ¿ )
O(i; ¿) = n(0; ")
where m("; ¿) is the total number of Originators entered between time " and
¿ while n(0;") is the total number of Developers entered before …rm i:
Figure 2 depicts the weighted number of collaborations signed as a Devel-
oper (crosses) and Originator (triangles) plotted against time of entry, ". It is
straightforward to notice that — even after controlling both for di¤erences in
time horizons and number of potential partners — early entrants (…rms and
institutions that entered the market before 1981) establish a larger number of
agreements than later ones, with a remarkable …rst mover advantage (see also
Powell et al, 1996). Besides, …rms which entered the market after 1992 have
13
established more agreements as Developers than expected.
Taken together, these …ndings suggest that some of the most relevant fea-
tures of the structural evolution of the market for technology in pharmaceuticals
cannot be analyzed and interpreted only by referring to parameters like size of
the market and ‡ows of …rms entry.
Deg(²; t¤)
t2
*t1
*
Figure 2: Contractual relationships, relational roles, and dates of entry
t¤
In a companion paper we perform a comprehensive analysis of the structural
properties of the market by means of graph theoretical measures, unequivocally
showing that the digraph is asymmetric, intransitive and hierarchically struc-
tured (Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000)
In the context of this work, we test a stochastic model of market interdepen-
dence to estimate the impact of technology and timing of entry on the relational
behavior of …rms and institutions within the market.
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A logit p-star model (Strauss, Ikeda, 1990) is applied, in order to detect how
structural variables a¤ect the probability of a tie being present or absent within
the graph. The presence or the absence of a tie going from o to d is character-
ized as the dichotomous stochastic variable ado, conditionally dependent on the
presence or absence of other ties in a given ‘neighborhood’.
Since every tie is dependent on the ties of its neighborhood and, at the
same time, it is part of the neighborhood of other ties, the graph instantiates
a local self-organizing process, given by the joint probability of particular local
substructures to occur. In p¤ models, the speci…cation of the relevant neighbor-
hood is based on Markov graphs. As a matter of fact, the Markovian assumption
greatly simpli…es the dependence structure within the graph, naturally leading
to a maximum pseudo-likelihood estimation technique (Wasserman, Pattison,
1996; Pattison, Wasserman, 1997; Anderson, Wasserman, Crouch, 1999). As
for our analysis, it is important to notice that the application of a p¤ model is
consistent in principle with the characterization of the market as an interacting
system (see Kirman, 1998). However, one has to remember that p-star models
rest upon two crucial assumptions:
Ass. 1 - Markov property. Edges within the graph are conditionally de-
pendent if and only if they have a node in common; i.e., a lattice structure
is introduced in order to represent the relevant technological neighborhood of
each …rm/institution. In the contest of our analysis, the Markov property im-
plies that the probability of a given …rm to take part to di¤erent collaboration
agreements, given the overall market structure, is not simply equal to the prod-
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uct of their marginal conditional probabilities. The Bernoulli model, in which all
edges are conditionally independent, can be considered as an extreme case, and
more complex local interdependence con…gurations can be taken into account.
Ass. 2 - Homogeneity property. In order to make the model identi…able, dif-
ferent …rms/institutions must react in the same way to isomorphic local market
con…gurations. This assumption rules out any source of heterogeneity in the
dependence structure, since it implies that the probability to observe a tie de-
pends on the same local graph con…guration irrespectively of di¤erences among
agents.
As for the plausibility of Assumptions 1 and 2 in the context of our work,
it is reasonable to assume that, for every …rm, the number of external linkages
depends on both its strategy and technological background. Hence, external
linkages in R&D of a given …rm are interdependent, since they draw on a com-
mon technological basis and are realized in the context of a common general
strategy. As a consequence, a Markov assumption is more plausible than an
assumption of independence, while it does not imply a strong restriction as
compared to an hypothesis of general interdependence. On the contrary, the
homogeneity assumption appears to be particularly restrictive, and it suggests
a careful interpretation of regression outcomes. In fact, in order to obtain infor-
mative results and appropriate conditioning information, one should take into
account the existence of technological capabilities that are heterogeneous across
…rms. To mitigate this problem, we test a second relational model, which in-
corporates a classi…cation of …rms according to dates of foundation and entry
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within the market.
Given the Markov and the Homogeneity assumptions, the general logit p-star
model that we test can be written as:
$ij = log
½
Pr (Ado = 1 j Acdo)
Pr (Ado = 0 j Acdo)
¾
= ¯
0
[d (ado)]
We calculate the Maximum Pseudo-Likelihood Estimations of parameters ¯
for di¤erent change statistics d (ado) = z
¡
a+do
¢
¡ z
¡
a¡do
¢
; where z
¡
a+do
¢
is the
value of a given vector of network statistics with ado set equal to 1 and z
¡
a¡do
¢
with ado set to 0.
We report the output of two relational models. The two models are based
on the same three variables, which correspond to the most fundamental rela-
tional roles detectable within the market: Cos (cospecialization), Gen (general-
ity), and Syn (synthesis) which correspond to three network change statistics:
edges [¡!], 2-out stars [ -%] and 2-in stars [&.]. These measures have
been selected among the stars of size three or less de…ning the neighborhood
of every node as they came out to be the most signi…cant in terms of both
Wald and Likelihood Ratio tests4 . The Cos parameter measures the e¤ect of
one-to-one relationships within the market, and substantiates the tendency to-
wards co-specialized research activity, while the other two parameters denote
the transversality e¤ect, measured through two out and in stars, for Originators
(Gen), and Developers (Syn).
4 Frank, Strauss, 1986 demostrate that stars of size three or less are su¢cient statistics for
the network dependence structure.
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Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of our econometric estimates. Notably,
the high, negative, and signi…cant values of Cos in both models constitute reli-
able measures of the importance of coupled …rms/institutions within the market.
In fact, most of the …rms and institutions entered the market by means of a co-
specialized relationship, while the probability of a second collaboration drops
considerably. Even more interestingly, the other two parameters are positive,
indicating that transversality, in particular by Developers (Syn ), lead to a higher
propensity to establish new external linkages.
All in all, these results are coherent with those obtained by previous analyses
in this …eld, but they are far more accurate in terms of the structural insights
they convey. As an example, we are able to detect both the complementary e¤ect
captured in Arora, Gambardella, 1994, and the centralization e¤ect character-
ized in Powell et al., 1996, as well as the absorptive and integrative capabilities
e¤ect illustrated in Henderson, 1994.
Table 1: Model A
Variables ¯ S.E. Wald exp(¯)
Cos. -7.1519 0.0400 31919.99 0.0008
Gen. 0.0781 0.0013 3712.16 1.0812
Syn. 0.1840 0.0051 1288.07 1.2021
-2 Log Likelihood: 17618.80 Overall …t: 99.80
Goodness of Fit: 531635.25 Residual (Absolute): 2758.80
Model Chisquare: 964046.73 df: 3 Residual (Squared): 1403.91
The model A presented in Table 1 does not take into account any kind of
heterogeneity among actors. Needless to say, this assumption represent a severe
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limitation both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. In fact, we
already know that di¤erences in technological content of R&D collaborations
can induce di¤erences in market structure.
Thus, as we have already shown that new technologies have been introduced
by new entrants, we test a second model with a generational structure (model
B): On the basis of an analysis of peaks of entry within the industry (dates
of foundation), four generation of …rms and the set of institutions have been
distinguished (see also Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000). As for …rms gen-
erations, Established Pharmaceutical Firms, Institutions, and NBFs founded
before 1981, from 1982 to 1989, and after 1990 have been distinguished and —
coherently with our previous discussion — a hierarchical structure is assumed
(Table 2).
Despite the additional constraints, the general …t of the model remain al-
most the same. Notably, the values of Syn become higher for Pharmaceutical
Firms and older NBFs than for younger NBFs and Institutions, qualifying, in a
di¤erent way, the existence of a temporal hierarchy within the network. On the
other hand, parameter Gen is almost the same for all NBFs, but now the stan-
dard error is lower for younger generations. The lower value of Gen standard
error after 1990 suggest that a high fraction of younger NBFs have a generalist
attitude, as compared to the very few of previous generations (like Genentech,
Chiron, Amgen).
All in all, we have shown that the market for technology in pharmaceuticals
has a distinct hierarchical structure. Clearly, lead pharmaceutical …rms play a
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pivotal role as project Developers, as they are able to sustain a large number of
R&D trajectories. On the contrary, only a restricted group of NBFs stand out
as general purpose Originators, while the overwhelming majority of them have
been con…ned to R&D trajectories that have tended to become more and more
speci…c over time.
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Table 4(a): Model B; Block matrix structure
Originators
Pharma NBF  81 NBF 82-89 NBF 90-97 Inst.
Pharma b11 b12 b13 b14 b15
NBF  81 0 b22 b23 b24 b25
Developers NBF 82-89 0 0 b33 b34 b35
NBF 90-97 0 0 0 b44 b45
Inst. 0 0 0 0 b55
Table 4(b): Model B (with generation blocks)
Variables Block ¯ S.E. Wald exp(¯)
Cos. - -6.8537 0.0364 35506.39 0.0011
Gen. Pharma 0.0615 0.0034 319.57 1.0635
Gen. NBF <81 0.0808 0.0041 396.91 1.0841
Gen. NBF 82-89 0.0804 0.0023 1180.02 1.0837
Gen. NBF 90-97 0.0807 0.0019 1758.94 1.0840
Syn. Pharma 0.3024 0.0120 451.37 1.2670
Syn. NBF <81 0.2250 0.0113 398.32 1.2524
Syn. NBF 82-89 0.2074 0.0106 386.21 1.2304
Syn. NBF 90-97 0.1378 0.0101 187.97 1.1478
-2 Log Likelihood: 17897.27 Overall …t: 99.80
Goodness of Fit: 622573.47 Residuals (Absolute): 2747.59
Model Chisquare: 963768.26 df: 8 Residuals (Squared): 1397.97
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3.3 Technologies and market interdependencies. A bridge
to local interaction
So far, we have imposed an a priori de…nition of local relationships within the
market. That is, we have assumed that R&D collaborations are interdependent
as long as they pertain to a given …rm/institution. Here, we abandon this
local interdependence assumption, trying to meaningfully decompose the overall
market for technology into speci…c submarkets.
In order to identify almost independent technological submarkets, we look
for strongly interconnected subgraphsby means of the methodology of Canoni-
cal Decomposition of a Graph introduced by Dulmage and Mendelsohn (1958,
1959):
A graph Mµ is extracted from the overall market for technology M by consid-
ering the contractual relationships between two independent set of …rms/institutions
(Originators and Developers) at any given period µ:
In Figure 3 we synthetize the logic of the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposi-
tion. Boxes M 1; M2 represent two non trivial submarkets. In our analysis, a
non-trivial submarket is a strongly connected component; that is, a subgraph
in which it is possible to couple each Originator with a di¤erent Developer (for
further details, see Diersel, 1997; Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000). Each
submarket includes a subset of Developers and Originators. Some Developers
in submarket M1 link with Originators in box M2: they correspond to what we
call Transversal Developers (TransDev) and Transversal Originators (TransOr).
The remaining Originators and Developers are wholly specialized in submarkets
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M1 M2
CospDev TransDev
CospOr TransOr CospOr
CospDev
Core Fringe
Figure 2: Figure 3: Transversal and cospecialized nodes within the graph
M 1 or M2 so we call them respectively Co-specialized Originators (CospOr)
and Co-specialized Developers (CospDev ).
The two sets of …rms/institutions denoted as TransDev and TransOr can
be thought of as the structural attractors of the overall market, as they at-
tract most of the agreements in each period of time. On this, it is important
to notice that while Co-specialized …rms are localized within speci…c and well
identi…ed technological tra jectories/submarkets, TransDev and TransOr …rms
cannot be assigned unambiguously to any given submarket/R&D trajectory, and
prevent the market from being fully decomposable. In other words, …rms that
are classi…ed as Transversal Developers and Originators are delocalized within
the market, since they establish several relationships with a wide variety of …rms
in di¤erent technological submarkets.
As for our empirical analysis, it is possible to demonstrate that the relational
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Figure 3: Figure 4: Number of …rms by relational category
roles that have been identi…ed correspond to …rms embodying di¤erent types
of technologies and that the changes over time in such roles correspond to the
emergence of a new set of technologies, i.e. transversal technologies.
Figure 4 plots the moving average of the number of …rms classi…ed according
to relational categories in terms of co-specialization/transversality. As it is clear,
the set of …rms playing a transversal role within the market has taken o¤ only
after 1992, the year in which the …rst new general purpose research technology,
entered the market. At the same time, throughout the whole time period under
observation, the number of …rms that have been acting as CospOr steadily
increase. Correspondingly, from 1992 to 1997 the market has been characterized
by the coexistence of both CospOr and TransOr …rms.
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As an example of the implications of the emergence of the new transversal
component within the market, Figure 4 refers to R&D agreements subscribed in
1997, after the emergence of the transversal component of the market. Subma-
trices A1; A2 correspond to submarkets M1; M2, while T marks the matrix area
in which transversal R&D collaborations are con…ned5 . The area T is the area
that corresponds to transversal …rms. Starting from the beginning of the Ninen-
ties, the new technological paradigm driven by the entry of new general purpose
research technologies has started to couple with the previous one, mainly based
on the growth through speci…cation of biological knowledge. The coupling be-
tween the two regimes seems to have induced a dramatic increase of the overall
degree of interdependence within the market. That is to say, the market has
started to be more and more indecomposable, because of the coexistence of a va-
riety of decomposition criteria, integrative mechanisms and, moreover, because
of a higher degree of interdependence among research tra jectories.
Further information on the technological bases of relational transversality
has been gained through a detailed analysis of the technological background of
Transversal Originators based on personal interviews, information provided by
10K and 10Q SEC …les reports, specialized press, and our proprietary data set
on R&D projects within the industry. As a result,.we are able to state that
relational roles that have been identi…ed within the market correspond to …rms
embodying di¤erent types of technologies. In particular, our controls show that
5 Since the number of connected components ofMµ is always greater than one, by permuting
rows and columns the adjacency matrix A(M)µ corresponding toMµ can be put into the form
of Figure 4.
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Originators  
Figure 4: Figure 5: Canonical Decomposition of the market, 1997
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technological transversality is a major determinant of relational transversality
within the market. In fact, all the …rms that have been identi…ed as Transver-
sal Originators have been active in …elds characterized by transversal research
technologies, such as new drug delivery systems, combinatorial chemistry, ge-
nomics, genomic libraries, proteomics, highthroughput screening, and bioinfor-
matics (for more details on this see Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000). Al-
most all the …rms which are included in PHID as active in general purpose
research technologies have been classi…ed by the algorithm as Transversal Orig-
inators. Conversely, and most important, all the …rms that have been identi…ed
as Transversal Originators into the graph by means of our analytical procedures
embody Transversal Technologies.
Given this …rst correspondence between …rms market position and their tech-
nological background, we analyze the Developers (Table 5a) and Originators
(Table 5b) turnover in terms of market position (co-specialized/transversal).
This analysis is useful as it shows the e¤ect of the entry of the new transversal
technologies after 1992. The number of transversal …rms acting as Originators
is almost four times greater after 1992. Moreover, only a small subset of the
initial set of transversal Originators (active in the drug delivery area) persist
after 1992, while a relevant proportion of new entrants act as general purpose
search technology providers. Despite the steady increase of the degree of mar-
ket transversality, most of the …rms still co-operate in specialized submarkets.
In particular, new transversal entrants have started to act as Originators not
only in their relationships with early entrants, but also with young entrants, en-
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dowed with powerful research hypotheses associated with the biology of a given
pathology, but lacking capabilities and skills in …elds such as chemical diversity
generation and screening. Co-specialized …rms experience a high mortality and
turnover within the market. New waves of …rms/institutions enter speci…c ther-
apeutic markets with co-specialized technologies, and only a very small minority
of them survive, becomes more diversi…ed, and transversal.
As for transversal …rms on the Developers side, it is possible to notice that
the group of transversal Developers is composed by a highly stable oligopolistic
core, which bene…ts from a relevant …rst mover advantage and consolidates after
1992, as a consequence of the coupling between the two basic search regimes.
As shown in Table 6, the set of …rms active within the industry playing a
TransDev role is composed by the very same group of large R&D intensive
pharmaceutical …rms that entered the market for technology very early on, and
that have been playing a role of structural attractors during the whole history
of bio-pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, Table 5 and Table 6 reveal that those
…rms that started to act as TransDev since the beginning of the Nineties were
already part of the core of the market in the previous years.
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Tab. 5 — Transition Probability Matrix of relational roles, ante/post 1992.
(a) exit CospDev TransDev
entry - 95.75 4.25
CospDev 65.15 31.74 3.11
TransDev 16.67 43.33 40
(b) exit CospOr TransOr
entry - 93.88 6.12
CospOr 65.23 32.17 2.60
TransOr 50.51 42.93 6.56
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Table 6: First 15 …rms active as TranDev,1981-1997
TransDev Firms Number of years
Ho¤mann-La Roche¤ 7
Glaxo Wellcome¤ 6
SmithKline¤ 6
Abbott¤ 5
Bayer¤ 4
Bristol-Myers Squibb¤ 4
Merck & Co¤ 4
P…zer¤ 4
Schering-Plough¤ 4
Ciba-Geigy/Novartis¤ 4
DuPont¤ 3
Hoechst Marion Roussel 3
Lilly¤ 3
Sandoz/Novartis¤ 3
Wyeth-Ayerst¤ 3
(¤) Firms that were CospDev before 1992
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4 Concluding discussion
In this paper we have analyzed the structural evolution of the market for tech-
nologies in pharmaceuticals in the last twenty years.
On the positive side, this essay con…rms that some fundamental structural
properties observed at the level of relevant knowledge bases are preserved in the
structural evolution of the overall system of relationships (see also Orsenigo,
Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000). Speci…cally, both the growth of knowledge and
the structural evolution of the market have been characterized by fast expan-
sion, proliferation of research trajectories and techniques, and hierarchization.
The cumulative nature of such processes has been imposing di¤erent degrees
of structural stability within the market. Finally, major changes in the market
structure have occurred in correspondence with the emergence of a new set of
general purpose technologies.
Moreover, relevant knowledge bases and related learning processes have in-
duced particular patterns of division of labour between di¤erent types of …rms
active within the market. Our results indicate that two di¤erent logics of ex-
ploration and technological advance have been coexisting and complementing
each other in the process of market evolution. The …rst avenue has been fol-
lowing a trajectory of increasing speci…cation of biological knowledge and re-
search hypotheses. The second has been progressing towards the development
of transversal techniques to generate and screen compounds and molecules. The
…rst trajectory has been generating patterns of division of labour in which older
generations of …rms have been working at higher levels of generality linking
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with successive generations of new entrants, who typically embodied increas-
ingly speci…c hypotheses and techniques. The second trajectory has tended to
alter this inter-generation structure. All in all, several mechanisms, rooted on
markets, …rms, and technologies, have in‡uenced the patterns of division of
labour, dynamically interacting to produce quite complex structures.
In both cases, established R&D-intensive pharmaceutical …rms have been
able to absorb the new knowledge by interacting with new entrants. In fact, the
expansion of the network has been driven mainly by the entry of new agents
embodying new techniques. The network has taken a distinct hierarchical struc-
ture, with di¤erent …rms operating at di¤erent levels of generality, which was
perturbed but not broken by transversal techniques. The above evidences sup-
port, in our view, two hypotheses already advanced in the literature, namely:
a) the cumulativeness of learning and competence building processes (see Hen-
derson, Orsenigo, and Pisano, 1999); b) the signi…cant capabilities by a core
of established multi—technology, R&D intensive, corporations to absorb new
knowledge and techniques generated outside …rms boundaries, despite major
technological discontinuities and breakthroughs initially resulting in the growth
of specialized technology producers. (see Henderson, 1994).
The evidence presented in this paper suggests also that …rms tend to be
persistent in their structural position within the market. Put it in another
way, specialist …rms have tended to remain specialists, while early entrants have
enjoyed signi…cant …rst mover advantages, precisely because they have been able
to embody knowledge at a high level of generality. Thus, a major asymmetry
32
has characterised the evolution of the market: while in many cases “generalist”
…rms have been able to (gradually) absorb increasingly speci…c knowledge (at
least along particular tra jectories of research), specialist …rms found it much
harder to move into the opposite direction.
Obviously, …rst mover advantages, the asymmetry between “generalists” and
specialists and —more broadly— the observed process of hierarchization of the
market, may well be related to other “more traditional” variables, such as …rms
size, degrees of diversi…cation, available resources, etc. In more general terms,
one can legitimately wonder if the observed dynamics of the market is after all
an “unconditional object”, which might have been generated by processes and
in‡uenced by di¤erent variables than those emphasised in this paper. Indeed,
controlling for variables like …rms size, diversi…cation, propensity to make agree-
ments, etc., constitutes an important part of our future research agenda. It is
worth noting, however, that …rst, an explanation based on conventional …rms
features is not in contrast with our interpretation. Second, the results we get
support the potential value of an approach.which emphasizes the relevance of
the speci…c properties of relevants knowledge bases, learning, and technologies.
In particular, one has to notice that the market for technology that we have
been analyzing, even if it is the product of a collection of individual exchanges
conducted through legal contracts (licensing agreements), cannot be analyzed
as if it was a ‘conventional’ market. On the one hand, it changes its nature
over time, sustaining a wide spectrum of structural con…gurations and foster-
ing a continuous expansion of the set of productive opportunities. On the other
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hand, …rms and technologies that are embedded within it generate a degree
of interconnectivity that one would expect within a given organization rather
than in a decentralized system of autonomous agents linked through individual
contractual relationships.
On a more methodological vein, the topological methods we have applied in
the context of this paper seem to be a powerful device to deal with the evolving
nature of markets for technology. Facing a system of contractual relationships
that is perturbed by dramatic technological breakthroughs, they convey infor-
mation that is global in nature and complements nicely the local information
that is provided by local di¤erential operators embedded in any econometric
exercise. In particular, it is possible to compare alternative (qualitatevely di-
verse) structural con…gurations of the overall system at di¤erent points in time,
distinguishing set of actors that play di¤erent relational roles within the mar-
ket. Moreover, these graph theoretical tools and measures succeed in unraveling
how technological change generates a number of more or less distinct submar-
kets characterized by di¤erent degrees of interdependence. On this, sectoral
speci…city notwithstanding, a more general issue which arises from this paper
refers to admissible aggregations in the study of a market for technologies, an-
alyzed as a dynamic interdependent system. That is, the conditions at which
a large system of interacting economic agents can be clustered into a small
number of groups, so that interactions among the nodes that pertain to every
single group can be studied independently from interactions among groups and,
conversely, interaction among groups may be analyzed without reference to the
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interaction within groups. It is our claim that such an apparatus can be used
in any R&D intensive industry, to assess the implications of entrepreneurship,
technologies, and markets for patterns of specialization and division of labor,
industry structure and, ultimately, economic growth
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